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Introduction
This paper relates the issue of privatization of public enterprises (that is, the transfer of ownership and control of state owned firms to the private sector) with firm's entry, exit, and efficiency. The first section provides an overview of firm entry and exit and briefly reviews the empirical findings in industrial organization literature concerning firm entry and exit. The second section presents the findings of Sen's (1997) survey of privatized firms in Bangladesh and interprets it in light of industrial organization literature.
[1] Entry and Exit
Entry and exit of firms are an indispensable part of the evolution of an economy's industrial structure. Some firms enter an industry by either buying or building new plant and equipment. Some firms buy up other firms' existing plant and equipment. Other firms switch from one industry to another by converting its existing plant and equipment, with some additional investment if necessary. New firms are generally much smaller than incumbent firms, and start with much less capital.
Existing firms expand in many different ways. Some firms acquire other firms in the same industry. Some firms increase their market dominance and increase their level of investment. Some firms expand vertically, some horizontally, while others in both ways, through mergers and acquisitions. A few firms, investing in an array of activities, become conglomerates.
Firms that are unable to adapt to changes in economic conditions fail to earn profits. Thus, while robust and dynamic firms thrive and grow, weak firms fail because of poor and incompetent management, inappropriate choice of technology and technique, and inability to satisfy consumers. The survival of a firm may be linked to its current profits and lagged profits, sales, the industry's current and past growth, and so forth. Large incumbent firms often have an edge over entrants due to economies of scale, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages.
Suppose the entry-inducing price is P E and the competitive price is P C . Then the entrant would bear the cost ρ=P E -P C >0 which an incumbent would not. This gives such incumbents a clear and distinct advantage. privatization, 73 firms (38 percent) were earning profits, or at least breaking even.
This shows that the number of firms making profit has increased after privatization.
The survey reports that there has been substantial labor retrenchment following privatization. Cohort analysis of enterprises currently operating shows that the extent of labor retrenchment is approximately 24 percent of workers employed prior to privatization. The survey finds that the retention rate is high: Among the workers employed in privatized firms approximately 60 percent of the workers were employed prior to privatization. Among closed enterprises, retrenchment is high:
Nearly 39,000 workers have been fired since privatization. The survey does not report any noticeable difference in the shedding of production and non-production
workers. At present public ownership of industry is neither necessary nor sufficient for promoting most industrial activity in Bangladesh. If the authorities believe that any particular activity is beneficial then they may attain that objective by directly subsidizing it or using some other appropriate instrument to attain their objectives rather than retain the enterprise under public ownership. However, providing direct subsidy under a privatization regime could be politically more difficult to justify and sustain in the long run. 2 The reporting of the profit in the survey is voluntary. It is not inconceivable that the owners of privatized firms are reluctant to accurately report profitability in order to evade or avoid taxation. Since most of the data in the survey is selfreported, the survey results are of limited value. Further research is required to independently verify the validity of these findings.
An Interpretation of the Survey Results

Sen
Under public ownership the management hired an excess number of workers and often exaggerated the number of workers on its payroll. Upon privatization, the private sector is not able to support the excessive workforce and the consequent high wage bill. Thus, the large amount of labor retrenchment is not unexpected.
After privatization, the new management dismisses excessive work force. The retrenchment of excess workers in these enterprises following privatization can be beneficial if it leads to a more rational reallocation of resources. The social costs of unemployment could be addressed by finding alternative employment, providing training opportunities, and giving unemployment compensation and relocation payments to those unemployed as a result of privatization.
